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Telecommunications Law and Technology in 
the Developing World 
Edward R Leahy * & Michael 0 'Brien ** 
INTRODUCTION 
The world is currently divided into information-technology haves 
and have-nots. Developing countries have approximately 75% of the 
world's population but only 12% of the world's telephone lines;l ap-
proximately 4 billion of the world's 5 billion people do not have a 
telephone.2 The 24 developed member countries of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") average 49 
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, while the rest of the world aver-
ages 3.5 lines per 100 inhabitants.3 Indeed, some of the poorest coun-
tries average less than 1 line per 1,000 inhabitants.4 The advent of 
Internet computing and its corresponding increase in equipment costs 
threaten to exacerbate this disparity.5 
Modern telecommunications affects much more than a nation's 
communications industry per se. Telecommunications is connected in-
herently to advances in other critical areas. 6 For example, education 
which utilizes multimedia systems in place of plain textbooks can 
increase student retention rates significantly and provide children with 
greater educational opportunities.7 Similarly, health-care systems can 
* Partner, Bingham Dana, LLP, Washington, D.C. 
** Associate, Thacher Proffitt & Wood, New York, New York. 
I See ROBERT J. SAUNDERS, ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 4 (2d 
ed. 1994). 
2 BELLA MODY, ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLITICS: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE 
INFORMATION HIGHWAY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES xvi (1995). 
3Id. 
4Id. 
5 While technological advances and increased competition in telecommunications equipment 
have lowered the cost of basic equipment for voice transmission, the need to possess equipment 
that can send and receive images, video, text and voice (i.e., a personal computer-type device) in 
order to take advantage of current technology has resulted in a net increase in equipment costs. 
6 See infra notes 7, 8 and 9 and accompanying text. 
7 See Information Infrastructure Task Force, The Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda fOT 
Cooperation, section I(C) (1995) (version 1.0), (March 15, 1999) <http://www.iitf.doc.gov> (un· 
der documents). The Information Infrastructure Task Force is a cross-agency endeavor among 
1 
2 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXII, No. 1 
be improved through telemedicine facilities that link rural physicians 
to major medical centers for assistance on difficult diagnoses,s and 
financial markets thrive on the free flow of information.9 
It is a principle of mainstream economics that information is as 
fundamental for production as are labor and capital. lO As one econo-
mist stated, "You can grow produce without fertilizer, just as you can 
run an economy without telecommunications, but each is considerably 
less efficient without these basic inputs. "11 Since telecommunications 
is now commonly seen as the nervous system of the modern nation (in 
the way that transportation channels once were), it is widely acknow-
ledged that improving developing countries' telecom systems must be 
a top priority.12 
Political leaders have acknowledged the priority of telecommunica-
tions development by calling for greater private investment in telecom-
munications. Unfortunately, the relationship between telecommunica-
tions investment and the developing world presents a rather vicious 
circle: political and economic instability inhibits foreign investment in 
telecommunications, while the lack of investment in telecommunica-
tions fosters political and economic instability. One of the primary 
purposes of telecommunications law in the international arena must 
be to end this detrimental cycle and its harmful effects on the peoples 
of developing countries. 
Once the nexus between telecommunications development and 
overall standards of living is recognized, it can be understood why an 
individual may consider telecommunications development to be analo-
gous to a moral or human rights issue.13 For example, Vice President 
the Departtnent of Commerce, the National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion ("NTIA"), the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") and the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs. 
B See id. The government of Mozambique recently inaugurated one of the first telemedicine 
facilities in Mrica. The system will be used to facilitate medical consultation, pathology diagnosis, 
education and emergency services to rural areas. 
9 Indeed, over-the-counter ("OTC") quotation systems such as the Nasdaq Stock Market are 
telecommunications systems. 
10 See Gwen Urey, Infrastructure for Global Financial Integration: The Role of the World Bank in 
MODY, ET AL., supra note 2, at 124. 
11 W. Richter, Economic Justification for Telecommunications Investtnent in Developing Coun-
tries, Address before the lOth ICC Executive Forum Global Imperativesfor the '90s (May 18,1990), 
quoted in Urey, supra note 10, at 124. 
12 See Information Infrastructure Task Force, The Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda for 
Cooperation, supra note 7, at preface. The Agenda states, 'We view technology not as an end in 
itself but as the means ... to improve the well-being of all people on this planet." Id. 
13 See infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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AI Gore has manifested his belief that developed nations have an 
obligation to advance information-technology in developing countries 
in order to promote the general welfare of the "Third World. "14 In fact, 
non-profit multilateral organizations such as the World Bank have 
played a primary role in the history of telecommunications develop-
ment.15 But the monies needed for telecom infrastructure develop-
ment surpass that which is actually available in the public sector, which 
is why governments have encouraged the for-profit community to in-
vest in the "emerging markets. "16 
Fortunately, most telecommunications investments historically have 
provided significant returns on equity, with financial rates of return 
generally running 15% and sometimes considerably higher. 17 However, 
the governments of developing nations often are slow to guarantee 
equal treatment of foreign investors in the telecom sector, as evidenced 
by the strong resistance of both state and private actors to the effort 
to privatize basic telecommunications services.18 Hence, the problem 
of enticing foreign investment is primarily a problem of politics, not 
economics. Telecommunications laws, if designed and implemented 
properly, have the capacity to diminish the fear and uncertainty that 
accompany lackluster investment in telecommunications and, conse-
quently, hinder human development. 
14 See Vice President AI Gore, Bringing Infurmatiun to the World: The Global Infurmatiun Infra-
structure, 9 HARV. J.L. & ThCH. I, 5 (1995). Vice President Gore asks, "How can we expect the 
final [telecommunications] system or organism, if you will, to express these values [of social 
well-being] if we do not inculcate these values into its DNA at its beginning?" Id. 
IS See Christopher J. Sozzi, Project Finance and Facilitating Telecommunicatiuns Infrastructure 
Development in Newly-Industrializing Countries, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH ThCH. LJ. 
435,436-39 (1996). Sozzi analyzes the benefits ofa "build-Qperate-transfer" financing mechanism, 
which will be discussed in Part III(B)(2)(b), infra. 
16 FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, Remarks at the Second World Telecommunication 
Development Conference (Mar. 23, 1998) ( <http://www.fcc.gov> (under speeches)). Vice Presi-
dent Gore introduced the U.S. vision for the Global Information Infrastructure ("GIl") at the 
First World Telecommunication Development Conference five years ago in March, 1994. 
17 See MODY, ET AL., supra note 2, at xv. 
18 See BEN A. PETRAZZINI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ThLECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 28 
(1995). There are several factors that stunt a government's ability to implement telecommunica-
tions reform. Telephone workers may fear job-cuts that will likely occur when a state-Qwned entity 
is privatized; the government may fear the loss of control which is accompanied by the influx of 
foreign management; and the citizens of a state may prefer philosophically the notion of public 
as opposed to private planning. See id.; see also WALTER T. MOLANO, THE LoGIC OF PRIVATIZATION: 
THE CASE OF ThLECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE OF LATIN AMERICA 1-20 (1997) 
(analyzing the political dynamic between government and interest groups when considering a 
telecommunications privatization). 
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The purpose of this article is to venture beyond the mantras of 
"privatization" and "liberalization" in order to unearth the concrete 
issues that make or break telecom system development. This article is, 
therefore, a guide for policy makers and the corporations that will 
negotiate with them when a telecommunications transaction is on the 
table. Because there are numerous variables in any potential deal, 
whether it be the form of the system (e.g., wireline, wireless or satellite) 
or the type of financing (e.g., project finance, public offerings or 
debt-swaps), the goal of this article is not to produce a single plan for 
any and every developing country. Rather, it is to explain the varying 
needs of the public and private players and to demonstrate how mod-
ern telecommunications law can be used to produce an effective agree-
ment between willing governments and able foreign investors. Part I 
identifies and analyzes the goals and needs of the potential telecom 
investor. Part II analyzes the current position of developing countries' 
governments in relation to their history of monopolistic telecom sys-
tems. Part III then integrates these two macro positions with the diverse 
tools of modern telecommunications law, showing how problems in-
volving universal service, national security and lackluster competition 
can be resolved rather painlessly via contract law and domestic regu-
lation without the need to resort, in the first instance, to international 
agreemen ts.19 
I. THE NATURE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
The governments of developing countries may look to several types 
of foreign investors, including multilateral agencies, commercial banks 
and corporations in the telecommunications industry.20 The invest-
ments may take the form of non-equity credits and loans, equity capital 
or a combination of the twO.21 
19 This by no means suggests that all international agreements that undergird telecommunica-
tions investments are undesirable. However, as explained in Part III, infra, the current multilateral 
framework addressing telecommunications has been primarily designed to manage the major 
issues facing developed nations. 
There is no bright-line between developed and developing nations, but the twenty-four member 
nations of the OECD comprise the nucleus of the developed world. It is important to note, 
however, that many of the countries not represented in the OECD (e.g., China, Russia and many 
of the countries of southeast Asia) comprise powerful economic forces by themselves or in 
regional groups. 
20 See Andres B. Bande, Furward: Balancing Foreign Investment and Natiunal Development in 
MODY, ET AL., supra note 2, at ix. 
21 See Part I(A) and Part I(B), infra. 
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A. Non-equity Investrrumts 
In the past, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, Inter-
American Development Bank and Asian Development Bank have pro-
vided billions in loans and credits for telecom projects in developing 
countries.22 For example, from 1962 to 1989, the World Bank and 
International Development Association invested nearly $17 billion in 
loans and credits for telecommunications projects.23 But the funds for 
telecom development are limited and fall well short of the amount 
necessary for adequate investment.24 The World Bank lends less than 
2% of its total funds for telecom projects.25 Rather than focusing on 
increasing the amount of funds allocated for telecommunications in-
vestment by multilateral agencies, governmental organizations now 
tend to see private financing as a necessary complement to public 
financing.26 
In addition to the lack of public sector financing available to devel-
oping countries, many governments may not seek public sector assis-
tance to avoid a requirement of modifying macro economic policy in 
order to secure loans from multilateral agencies.27 A country receiving 
loans from the World Bank is required to conform its economic poli-
cies to standards that promote efficient economic development.28 With 
regard to a country's telecom industry, the World Bank will most likely 
require that the government adopt a more pro-competitive stance with 
regard to its regulation. 29 As one commentator stated, the World Bank's 
rule is "no intention to change-no investment financing."30 Although 
the World Bank's official policy is one of non-interference in member 
states' political affairs,!!l there is no question that it attaches to its loans 
22 See 8ozzi, supra note 15, at 438--40. 
2S SAUNDERS, ET AL., supra note 1, at 417-42. 
24 See infra notes 25 and 26, and accompanying text. 
25 Bande, supra note 20, at ix. 
26 See, e.g., Information Infrastructure Task Force, The Global Infurmation Infrastructure: Agenda 
fur Cooperaticm, supra note 7, at § II (A) . 
27 See infra notes 28 and 29, and accompanying text. 
28 See 8ozzi, supra note 15, at 439. 
29 See Urey, supra note 10, at 120. 
so Bjorn Wellenius, Financing Telecommunications Infrastructure-Who Wants to Invest? In 
What, at What Price?, Address before the Financial Times Conferences, Asia-Pacific Telecummu-
nications-A Magnet fur Fureign Investment (Feb. 28 - Mar. 1, 1994), quoted in Urey, supra note 
10, at 120. 
SI Articles of Agreement Between the United States of America and Other Powers Respecting 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, art. I, § 10 states 
that 'The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member." 
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conditions that are properly labeled "political."32 The corresponding 
loss of control by the government in these transactions is simply one 
more reason to look for investment from the private sector.!!!! 
Multilateral agencies will continue to loan billions of dollars to 
developing nations, and it would be misleading to imply that these 
loans and credits are not very significant. An infusion of $10 million 
to $100 million (which is not an uncommon loan amount from the 
World Bank for a telecom project) may have a tremendous effect on 
a developing nation.!l4 However, it is equally true that public-sector 
financing is but a small piece of the total amount invested in telecom-
munications annually.35 
Commercial banks also have played a large role in facilitating infra-
structure development in less developed countries, and they will con-
tinue to playa large, albeit somewhat different role. Whereas, in the 
past, commercial banks lent money directly to foreign governments to 
finance telecom infrastructure development (since there were few, if 
any, private telecommunications companies in developing nations), in 
the future they will loan more money to companies that make equity 
investments in developing countries in addition to financing govern-
ments directly. Before the latest Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s 
through the early 1990s,!!6 commercial banks were eager to loan money 
to developing nations with annual surpluses. By 1979, shortly before 
the beginning of the debt crisis, the public sector was responsible for 
a very large portion of the foreign debt in Latin American countries.!!7 
For example, the public debt amounted to 41 % in Argentina, 53% in 
Chile, 68% in Mexico and 40% in Venezuela.!!8 Much of this debt was 
incurred for the operation of State Owned Enterprises ("SOEs") like 
publicly-owned telecommunications companies.!!9 Mter the onset of 
the debt crisis, when the developing nations of Latin America could 
32 See Sozzi, supra note 15, at 439. 
33 See id. This is not to imply that there is not a corresponding loss of control in private lending 
or equity investments. 
34 See Saunders, supra note 1, at 417-21. 
35 For example, the estimated worldwide investment in telecommunications infrastructure in 
2004 is expected to exceed $200 billion annually. See Information Infrastructure Task Force, The 
Global Infunnation Infrastructure: Agendafur Cooperation, supra note 7, at § II(A). 
36 The latest Latin American debt crisis was actually the fourth in the history of Latin America. 
The three previous crises came in the 1820s, 1870s and 1930s. 
37 See Eduardo Barrera, The &le of Domestic Capital in Latin America, in MODY, ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 137. 
38Id. 
39 Id. 
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not secure new loans, they took steps to privatize their SOEs for the 
purpose of cancelling debt and avoiding the need to borrow more in 
the future to sustain the SOEs' often inefficient operations.40 It was 
during this time that the debt-for-equity swap became Latin America's 
principal concessionary program.41 Commercial banks and bondhold-
ers received equity interests in the SOEs in consideration for cancelling 
their (bad) debt.42 However, commercial banks are in the business of 
lending money, not receiving equity interests in former Latin American 
SOEs; therefore, such a debt-swap model, by design, is only an interim 
arrangement.411 Since lending is commercial banks' primary business, 
it follows that they will lend money to those interested in investing in 
telecommunications infrastructure, provided that such potential inves-
tors have stable balance sheets. As debt-laden governmental entities 
struggle to obtain financing, their former lenders will seek new lending 
opportunities with private corporations. Essentially, the Latin Ameri-
can debt crisis acted as a catalyst in reforming the telecommunications 
industry in that region.44 
More recently, the debt problems in Asia are producing the same 
result.45 As developing countries in Asia struggle to service their debt, 
they will likely encounter greater pressure to divest themselves of 
ownership of their SOEs, including their telecommunications systems. 
Countries incapable of achieving investment-grade debt ratings may 
simply be precluded from issuing debt at interest rates low enough to 
service, and/or high enough to attract sufficient interest in the invest-
ment community.46 Furthermore, commercial banks would prefer to 
40 See id. at 137-38. Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela completed privatizations of their 
telecom companies by 1990, although all of them met resistance. In 1988, Argentina failed in its 
first attempt to privatize its telecom SOE "ENTel." In 1991, political factions opposed to privati-
zation foiled attempts to privatize the telecom companies in Colombia, Brazil and Uruguay. 
41 See Anthony M. Vernava, Latin American Finance: A Financia~ Ecunomic and Legal Synopsis 
of Debt Swaps, Privatizations, Foreign Direct Investment Law Revisions and International Securities 
Issues, 15 WIS. INT'L. LJ. 89, 104-05 (1997). 
42 See id. at 105. 
43 Changing positions from that of lender to investor creates a host of issues for commercial 
banks, including, rather significantly, the effect on a bank's net capital requirements as regulated 
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation ("FDIC"), the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") or the Office of Thrift Supervision 
("OTS"), depending on which of these federal regulators is a given bank's primary regulatory 
agency. 
44SeeAnthonyM. Vernava, supra note 41, at 114. 
45See, e.g., Write-Offs fJyJapan's Top International Banks Hit Record, WALL ST.]., Apr. 1, 1998, 
at A15 (reporting thatJapan's top nineteen international banks wrote off a record $76.7 billion 
in problem loans in fiscal 1997). 
46 See Vernava, supra note 41, at 108. 
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loan money to profitable corporations desiring to invest in that region, 
rather than to the high-risk debtor governments themselves. Hence, 
the trend is toward commercial lending that will aid equity investment, 
not substitute for it.47 
B. The Nature of Equity Investment 
Since equity investment has emerged as a dominant investment form 
for foreign telecom investors, it should not be surprising that corpora-
tions in the telecommunications industry are becoming the principal 
players in the field.48 Mter all, the managerial and technological know-
how of existing telecom companies allows any investment to be used 
more efficiently. It is these telecom corporations, in conjunction with 
their lenders,49 that comprise the most important group of potential 
telecom investors for developing countries. 50 In order to understand 
the motivation of mature telecom corporations, it is necessary to grasp 
the current regulatory situation in developed countries. As opposed to 
the majority of the 185 member countries of the United Nations 
("UN"), most of the twenty-four developed member countries of the 
OECD have implemented telecommunications laws that either man-
date or encourage competition in telephony and cable television serv-
ices.51 In the United States, for example, the Telecommunications Act 
of 199652 was enacted amidst much fanfare because it removed most 
of the legal barriers preventing long-distance, local telephony and 
cable television companies from entering each other's markets.511 While 
47 See Information Infrastructure Task Force, The Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda fur 
Cooperation, supra note 7, at Part II (A) . 
48 See generally Sharmishta Bagchi-Sen & Parthavi Das, Foreign Direct Investment Ily the U.S. Bells, 
in Mony, ET AL., supra note 2, at 85. 
49 Depending on the size and type of investment by a telecom company, the company may 
finance its investment in a number of ways, e.g., by borrowing money from commercial banks, by 
issuing bonds to individual or institutional investors, or by selling preferred or common stock in 
the new foreign entity. 
50 See generaUy Bagchi-Sen & Das, supra note 48, at 85. 
5! See infra notes 86-92, and accompanying text. 
52 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered 
sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
53 See generaUy Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FEn. COM. LJ. 
1 (1996). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was the latest installment of U.S. competition law 
in the telecommunications industry. The Act is the logical outgrowth of the breakup of AT&T in 
the early 198Os. For an overview of the arguments against the old AT&T system, see United States 
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. and United States v. Western Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226 (D.D.C. 
1982). 
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the pro-competitive effects of the legislation have been very slow to 
appear, the impending threat of competition from well-financed com-
petitors has every telecommunications firm analyzing its ability to gain 
access to new markets. Hence, the prospect of gaining market presence 
in a developing country where little or no competition exists (as op-
posed to fighting an incumbent provider in a developed nation) is very 
inviting. 
Foreign investment by a mature telecom company produces several 
benefits. First, the monetary investment will likely vastly improve what 
is probably an antiquated and wholly unsatisfactory telecom system. 
Second, transfer of wireline and wireless technologies will enhance the 
efficient use of the monetary investment. Third, experienced manage-
ment will provide the human capital necessary to place the new tele-
com system in a position to compete in the emerging international 
marketplace.54 Furthermore, a well-developed system may increase the 
tax base, increase the total number of employees in the telecommuni-
cations and related industries, and provide advanced training to in-
digenous personnel. 
In consideration of these benefits, telecom firms have a variety of 
wishes and expectations that relate to the general health of the coun-
try's economy, as well as the particular business opportunity.55 With 
regard to the macroeconomic situation, a telecom firm will look to at 
least eight factors: 1) the health of macroeconomic superstructure 
such as banking, transportation, utilities, etc.; 2) the pattern of eco-
nomic growth; 3) the investments of the World Bank and other multi-
lateral institutions; 4) the level of private investment; 5) the current 
and projected inflation rate; 6) the laws governing repatriation of 
earnings; 7) the stability and convertibility of local currency; and 
8) the level of political risk and availability of risk insurance to offset 
it.56 
In addition, in considering the particular business opportunity, tele-
com firms will consider at least eight more factors: 1) the length of the 
startup/construction phase; 2) whether non-recourse financing is 
available for the investment; 3) whether the government is providing 
tax relief incentives; 4) whether the firm will have the ability to main-
tain market share by migrating to the next technology or service; 
5) whether the government has the ability to license sufficient wireless 
54 See Bande, supra note 20, at ix-x. 
55 See infra notes 57-58, and accompanying text. 
56 [d.; Bande, supra note 20, at xi. 
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frequency spectrum to the firm; 6) whether the firm's management 
will be able to participate in future telecom policy planning; 
7) whether the local labor force is capable of satisfying staffing needs; 
and 8) the length of time needed to realize a return on investment.57 
Of course, the government of a particular country will have varying 
degrees of control over these factors. For example, the decision to 
provide tax relief incentives is within a government's sole discretion, 
while a country's current and projected inflation rate is the product 
of myriad factors. Hence, disadvantages of factors beyond a govern-
ment's exclusive control must be offset by advantages within a govern-
ment's control. 
The logical result of this conceptual framework leads to a somewhat 
disturbing conclusion, i.e., the least developed countries will have to 
sacrifice the most (e.g., in tax relief and repatriation of earnings incen-
tives) in order to gain the investment needed to improve their telecom 
systems. This is an example of a concrete issue that manifests the 
conflict between theory and reality. In altruistic theory, the most dis-
advantaged countries are expected to sacrifice the least, while the least 
disadvantaged countries are expected to sacrifice the most (which 
presumes a goal of redistributing wealth on an international scale). 
But the theory confuses the moral inspiration aspect of the GIl with 
its strict economic application. 
In fact, the governments of developing countries are very conscious 
of this and other difficult issues.58 This consciousness, however, does 
not imply that all of the difficult issues in international telecommuni-
cations work to corporations' economic advantage. Most of the nations 
that are classified as "developing" possess very profitable, albeit anti-
57Id. 
58 In spite of the rhetoric of altruism when discussing the needs of developing countries, there 
aTe many aTeas of international telecommunications law which, frrima facie, appeaT to be objec-
tively fair to all countries when the system is actually inequitable. For an example, one can look 
to the pmcedUTe for acquiring geostationaTY satellite spots through the International Telecom-
munications Union ("lTV") (which is a UN agency). Geostationary (also called "orbital slot") 
spots aTe those satellite spots that remain static in relation to an aTea of the eaTtb. The CUTTent 
procedUTe for requesting the use of geostationaTY spots is a procedure of "fust come, fust served, " 
which may appeaT fair until one realizes that many developing countries lack the funds or 
technology to use the spots. The country of Tonga created controveny when it acquired six spots 
in 1991 and then pmceeded to rent an allotment to Unicorn, a United States company, and 
auction off the rest at a price of $2 million per yeaT for each spot. SeeJannat C. Thompson, Space 
fur Rent: The International Telecommunicatiuns Union, space Law, and Orbit/spectrum Leasing, 62 
J. AIR L. & COM. 279, 280--83 (1996); Don Riddick, Why Does Tunga Dum Outer spacer, 19 AIR & 
SPACE L. 15,20-22 (1994). 
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quated, telecom systems.59 Mature telecom firms are under increasing 
pressure to expand their operations through foreign activity, and the 
developing nations with profitable systems will likely have more than 
one corporate suitor.60 Profit-driven corporations will, therefore, likely 
compete with each other when negotiating with a foreign govern-
ment.61 
II. THE STATE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
In order to picture the state of telecommunications in developing 
countries, it is helpful to imagine a combination of the U.S. postal 
service with AT&T before its divestiture of the Bell operating compa-
nies that operates under the management of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission ("FCC") and prohibits competition in post or tele-
phone services. Similar entities exist in many developing countries and 
fall commonly under the name of Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and 
Telephones ("PTT"). As one might imagine, this is not the most effec-
tive or efficient enterprise. Throughout the developing world, the 
demand for telecommunications equipment and services far exceeds 
the supply, and the number of unmet applications for basic telephone 
connections often exceeds the number of existing lines.62 In Latin 
America and Asia, this demand has been fueled by the growth of urban 
middle and working classes desiring residential phone service.63 Chile 
provides an excellent example of the effects of pent-up demand com-
bined with a transformation from a monopolistic to a competitive 
59 See BEN A. PETRAZZINI, GLOBAL TELECOM TALKS: A TRILLION DOLLAR DEAL 57-58 (1996). 
60 This is a primary reason why the overwhelming majority of 185 UN members are not included 
in the sixty-nine signatories participating fully in the lauded World Trade Organization ("WTO") 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, which is the fourth protocol to the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services ("GATS"). While the fourth protocol is structured so that different countries 
make somewhat differing commitments, the signatories agreed in principle on February 15,1997, 
to open their telecom markets to all other members of the WTO. Many of the developing 
countries abstained on the grounds that they would be better off negotiating with individual 
corporations rather than being obligated to treat all newcomers equally. See infra notes 86--92, 
and accompanying text. 
61 The recent bidding contest for MCI presents a very good example of this in the context of 
developed nations. British Telecom was poised to acquire MCI in a $25 billion deal until World-
Com and GTE engaged in a bidding war which drove the price up to $42 billion. Although all 
the players involved were telecom firms in developed countries, the same principle applies. Those 
companies with strategic value will likely be the object of many suitors' affection. 
62 SAUNDERS, ET AL., supra note 1, at 9. 
63 See Joseph D. Straubhaar, From P7T to Private: Liberalization and Privatization in Eastern 
Europe and the Third World, in MODY, ET AL., supra note 2, at 11. 
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system.64 During the first eight years of the privatized system (1988-96) 
in that country, the number of phone lines increased more than 
four-fold from 500,000 to 2.2 million, and the growth rate accelerated 
from about a five percent trend to nearly twenty percent.65 
In contrast to developed nations that average over thirty phone lines 
per one hundred persons,66 developing countries average only about 
one and one-half lines per one hundred persons;67 many of the least 
developed telecom systems average fewer than one-half of one line per 
one hundred persons.68 Moreover, new applicants for phone service 
often wait between two and five years to obtain service.69 Overall, 
approximately 80% of the world's population does not have a tele-
phone.70 This predicament is, to a significant extent, the result of 
national laws that insulate their monopoly PITs from both domestic 
and foreign competition. 
A. The Future of Telecom Infrastructure in Developing Countries 
It is wrong to view the past telecom policies (and resulting laws) of 
developing countries' governments as tantamount to negligence. A 
primitive telecom system can serve many purposes. For example, while 
primitive telecom systems inhibit market economies, many govern-
ments of the past had little interest creating market economies. Like-
wise, while primitive telecom systems inhibit the free flow of ideas, 
many governments have no interest in facilitating the free flow of 
ideas.71 
Ironically, one of the primary goals of PITs is that which is the most 
difficult to achieve within an inefficient PTT bureaucracy: the goal of 
universal service. Many PITs were formed because of the belief that 
64 See Bjorn Wellenius, Social and Business Objectives of Telecommunications Policy, 21 FORDHAM 
INT'L LJ. 434, 436 (1997). 
65 See id. 
66 For comparison, the United States averages more than fifty phone lines per one hundred 
persons. See SAUNDERS ET AL., supra note 1, at 5. 
67 See id. 
68Id. at 6-7. For example, India has a ratio of 0.4; Rwanda has a ratio of 0.1; Sudan has a ratio 
of 0.2; Haiti has a ratio of 0.5 and Nigeria has a ratio of 0.2. 
69Id. at 9. 
70 MODY, ET AL., supra note 2, at xvi. 
71 Currently, one of the great balancing acts of modern politics involves the Chinese govern-
ment trying to enhance telecommunications development (including Internet access) while 
maintaining a totalitarian regime. See generally Joseph Kahn, et al., Chinese Firewall: Beijing Seeks 
to Build Version of the Internet that Can be Censored, Crackdoum, of Outside Views Al50 Includes 
Satellite TV and Financial News Wires, WALL ST.]., Jan. 31, 1996, at AI. 
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the extension of basic telephone service beyond areas most likely to 
be profitable for a private telecom company, i.e., rural and poorer 
communities, could best be conducted by a monopoly provider that 
would cross-subsidiz~ unprofitable operations in the poorer communi-
ties with profitable operations derived from urban and business cus-
tomers.72 Indeed, the rationale for granting AT&T a private monopoly 
in the United States followed the same line of reasoning.73 
However, in the current technological environment, universal serv-
ice should mean much more than basic voice telephony, which is why 
plans to attain universal service in developing nations should not be 
encumbered by yesterday's concept of telecommunications. In the 
past, many people equated telecommunications with wireline phone 
service. Currently, in addition to the advent of wireless service (using 
both radio and satellite technology), telecommunications encompasses 
a number of new information "appliances," most notably the personal 
computer and the services it provides-access to the World Wide Web 
and electronic mail, for example. 
The "convergence" of telecommunications and computing is the 
impetus driving the GII.74 A primary question facing the governments 
of developing nations is, therefore, how their countries can advance 
both to yesterday's (telephony-based) definition of universal service 
and to tomorrow's (computing-based) concept of the GIl. If a govern-
ment focuses exclusively (or even primarily) on the old, telephony-
based model, then the result of any agreement/contract with a private 
telecom firm will most likely be inadequate because such shortsighted-
ness would fail to consider the needs of a modern society. 
72 See Straubhaar, supra note 63, at 4. 
73 See id. It is incorrect to dismiss completely the notion that cross-subsidization by monopoly 
providers has no positive effects, and in Part III it will be seen that cross-subsidization is a concept 
that may still have good use. Many countries including the United States, France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom used the monopoly system to provide universal service. However, in time it 
became clear that universal service did not equal universally good service, and it is now accepted 
generally that the inefficiency associated with monopoly systems outweighs their positive effects. 
Whether or not a successful monopoly system is a necessary precondition to effective competitive 
telecom markets is precisely the question at issue in the developing world today. Based upon the 
number of developing nations who have changed or plan to change their PTT system, the answer 
to that question is a negative. For a detailed analysis of the benefits of the non-monopoly system, 
see BEN A PETRAZZINI, GLOBAL ThLECOM TALKS: A TtuLLION DOLLAR DEAL 32-55 (1996). 
74 See Information Infrastructure Task Force, The Global Infurmatiun Infrastructure: Agenda for 
Cooperatiun, supra note 7, at § I(A). 
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B. The Psychological Underpinnings of Public Ownership of Telecom 
Infrastructure 
Regardless of the benefits of a profit-driven telecommunications 
industry, many governments and peoples in developing countries are 
skeptical of private ownership of an historically public sector.75 From 
one perspective, such skepticism is simply a product of an inherent 
distrust of the capitalist motive.76 But from another perspective, distrust 
of private ownership of telecom infrastructure stems from the axiom 
that control of information is tantamount to control of the political 
and economic processes.77 
Private ownership of telecom systems may result in at least two 
different scenarios that give pause to the governmental leadership of 
a developing country. In the first scenario, a single company or group 
of companies may form an information/economic oligarchy which 
usurps the power of the government.78 In the second scenario, a robust 
telecom system would result in a massive decentralization of power by 
creating a radical democracy and/or a mild form of anarchy where the 
government is not overthrown, but rather, left behind.79 These two 
scenarios represent threats to both the power of an existing govern-
75 See Straubhaar, supra note 63, at 4-5. 
76 See id.; see also Maxwell O. Chibundu, Law and the Political Economy of Privatization in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 21 MD.]. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 9-17 (1997) (arguing that privatization was an 
instrument of "conservatism" against Marxist-Leninism). 
77 Indeed, the current debate over "key-escrow" cryptographic systems in the United States 
manifests a similar principle. Although the U.S. government, and the Clinton administration 
specifically, are arguably the prime movers of international telecommunications reform, its 
"liberal" and "open" agenda is tempered by its desire to secure law enforcement's ability to wiretap 
messages sent via computer. Although few doubt that information is the currency of democracy, 
the limitations on the flow of information are the subject of much debate in democratic and 
non-democratic nations, as well as developed and developing nations. For a comprehensive 
discussion of the proposed regulatory framework relating to key-escrow cryptograhy vis..Q.-vis U.S. 
constitutional law, see Michael A. Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper 
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709 (1995). 
78 Again, one may look to the United States for an example of similar concerns. The on-going 
battle between the U.S. Department of Justice and Microsoft presents antitrust issues which, on 
the surface, are couched in terms of consumer protection. However, at a deeper level, it is not 
difficult to identify the underlying issue of how much power a single corporation or industry 
should possess in a democratic society. For a comprehensive discussion of Microsoft's relationship 
with the U.S. Department of Justice, see Daniel]. Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, the Justice 
Department, and Antitrust Theory, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 621 (1996). 
79 It is this second scenario which, however unlikely, creates the greatest fear for governments 
because while an oligarchy may be difficult to defeat, it is not hard to find. Conversely, behind 
every door of a wired democracy may hide a traitor, terrorist, thief, tax-evader or smuggler 
operating clandestinely. 
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ment and the security of a nation overall. Since an existing government 
(or political party) will likely not cite its own survival as a reason to 
reject telecommunications reform, fears stemming from either of these 
two scenarios will likely be couched in terms of national security. 
The focus on national security is legitimate. Telecommunications is 
a strategic industry. It is the central nervous system of a country, 
connecting buyers and sellers, teachers and students, doctors and 
patients, political representatives and constituents. A society with an 
historical distrust of private ownership in the areas of infrastructure 
may need to take a collective deep breath before embracing the notion 
that private and foreign entities are most capable to build and operate 
telecom infrastructure. Some countries, such as China, have rejected 
the idea that foreign corporations must be relied upon to take a 
leading role in telecom development.so However, other countries that 
face the option of either relinquishing some control of their telecom 
systems or falling behind further in the technological and economic 
race are choosing to embrace the concept of foreign control, as well 
as assenting to foreign investment.S! 
C. The Needs of the Players in Perspective 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the needs of developing 
countries are both more complicated and more fundamental than the 
needs of the corporations that are, and will be, negotiating with them. 
While the needs of the corporations are all subsets of the primary 
economic concern (i.e., making money), the needs of developing 
countries are not so simple. Of course, it may be argued that develop-
ing nations' primary concern is also economic growth and that sophis-
ticated telecom systems are merely a means to that end. However, when 
considering developing nations' monopolistic past in relation to their 
preferred future, a complicated picture presents itself. Governments 
of the developing countries must dismantle their antiquated telecom 
systems and replace them with sophisticated information systems capa-
80 While China has contracted with a number of western technology companies (e.g., Motorola, 
Lucent Technologies, Ericsson and Siemens) to help it build its telecom system, the government 
has maintained the role of contractor while using foreign corporations as subcontractors. For an 
overview of the Chinese model, see Joseph Kahn, Beijing Puts a Wall Around Its Thriving Plume 
Systl'!m: China Telecom Sidelines Fureign Firms, Tops AT&T as Mobile-Plume King, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
28, 1997, at All. 
81 See Information Infrastructure Task Force, The Global Information Infrastrudure: Agenda fur 
Cooperation, supra note 7, at Part II(A). 
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ble of enabling a modern society without sacrificing too much auton-
omy, or swallowing too much national pride. Such a project, repeated 
in virtually every country undergoing the transformation, must utilize 
all the tools of telecommunications law in order to be a success. 
III. BEYOND MULTILATERALISM: TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw IN 
NATIONAL POLICY AND PRIVATE CONTRACT 
In order to determine how telecommunications law can work for 
developing countries, it is useful to analyze how telecommunications 
law has not worked for them. Recent developments within the WT082 
suggest that multilateral agreements will be the future of telecommu-
nications reform. Upon closer examination, however, these multilat-
eral advances lack strength to bring about telecom reform in develop-
ing nations. In fact, an analysis of the greatest achievement of the WTO 
with regard to telecommunications shows that multilateralism is but 
one paradigm for effecting telecom reform. It is not the end-all of 
telecommunications law, but only one manifestation. Because multilat-
eralism is encumbered by a slow-moving bureaucracy and, by its nature, 
must aim for widespread agreement, its power as a tool of telecommu-
nications law is restricted severely. 
Although the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications under 
"GATS," the most heralded international agreement in the history of 
telecommunications, provides the main example of failure with regard 
to telecommunications in developing nations,83 other tools of telecom-
munications law can help solve the existing problems of universal 
service and national security,84 as well as problems created by former 
monopolies stifling the entrance of new telecom service providers.85 
82 The wro is the formal successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") 
trading system. The United States' legislation implementing the wro treaty (The Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization) is 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (1997). The implementation 
legislation "fixed" a lingering problem surrounding the GATT. The U.S. joined the GATT in the 
1940s via executive agreement. Some individuals doubted the ability to join GATT without 
implementing legislation. 
83 See Part III (A), infra. 
84 See Part III (B) , infra. 
85 See Part III (C), infra. 
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A. The Irrelevance of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications 
to Developing Nations 
In trade talks held under the auspices of the WTO, sixty-nine coun-
tries agreed on February 15, 1997, to open nearly all of their telecom 
markets to foreign investment and competition when they signed on 
to the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications under the GATS.86 
Although this deal has been heralded as a "landmark" agreement,87 its 
legendary status maybe reserved for the (currently) developed world.88 
Mter all, nearly one-half of the members of the WTO (primarily devel-
oping nations) refused to join the agreement, and the sixty-nine par-
ticipating nations account for less than 40% of the 185 member nations 
of the UN. Furthermore, many of the developed nations participating 
in the agreement have either excluded certain sectors of their respec-
tive telecom industries from investment and competition or they have 
delayed the implementation date of their commitments.89 
86The GATS is annex 1B to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. The 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications is the Fourth Protocol to the GATS. (The Second 
Protocol concerns Financial Services. The Third Protocol concerns the Movement of Natural 
Persons. Other Protocols are reserved for future agreements.) 
The phrase "signed on to the agreement" (as opposed to "signed the agreement") acknow-
ledges a quirk of the world trading system. All 132 members of the wro must accept the GATS 
(as an annex). Since the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications is a part of the GATS (as the 
Fourth Protocol), all 132 members are parties to it also. However, the structure of the Fourth 
Protocol is such that parties who participate fully in it submit a "schedule" of commitments, which 
act as (quasi) self-binding assertions. Moreover, countries may exclude themselves from offering 
most-favored-nation ("MFN") trading status to other wro members with regard to almost all 
telecommunications services. Therefore, countries that neither submit schedules nor offer MFN 
status to other countries are, for all practical purposes, not signatories to the Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications although they are signatories technically by reason of being signatories to 
the original wro treaty. 
The Agreement on Basic Telecommunications went into effect on January 1,1998, although 
many participating countries are delaying their full entry into the agreement, with many delaying 
some concessions until well into the next millennium. 
For an overview of the GATS structure, see Mary E. Footer, The International Regulation ofTratU 
in Services Folluwing Completion of the Uruguay Round, 29 INT'L LAw. 453 (1995). 
87 See Kennard, supra note 16. 
88 See Tani Freedman, Suspense over Telecom's Deal Deepens as Deadline Looms, Agence 
France-Presse, Feb. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WI.. 2059036. Promoters of the agreement were 
quick to point out that the countries participating in the agreement accounted for nearly 95% 
of all revenue in international telecommunications services. While impressive, that figure shows 
the disturbing fact that more than 60% of the world's nations (including China and Russia) 
account for only 5% of revenues in international telecom services. 
89 It was common for countries to limit foreign ownership of "essential" facilities to 49% or less. 
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Further, the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications was unattrac-
tive to many developing nations because the concepts of privatization 
and liberalization (as conceived by the agreement's signatories), 
around which the agreement was centered, are not the whole of tele-
communications law. The concepts of privatization and liberalization 
are employed to achieve two differing purposes. Privatization (some-
times called commercialization) is supposed to bring efficiency to a 
previously state-owned PTT, while liberalization (permitting competi-
tion in telecom markets) is supposed to bring efficiency to the telecom 
industry for the benefit of both business and individual consumers.90 
Theoretically, privatization without liberalization is unattractive since 
a profit-driven enterprise operating as a monopoly will act selfishly to 
achieve "monopoly profits" at the expense of its customers,91 while 
liberalization in the absence of privatization is untenable for the gov-
ernments of developing nations since their lumbering PTTs could not 
compete adequately with nimble foreign competitors. 
Since their telecom firms were generally privately owned and, in 
many cases, already competing in their home markets, developed 
countries had little to fear from the wro agreement.92 In other words, 
the developed nations had already embraced privatization and liber-
alization in their home markets and were looking to extend the for-
mula internationally. But the concepts of privatization and liberaliza-
tion, by themselves, do not alleviate the basic concerns of developing 
nations mentioned previously (viz., universal service and national se-
curity). If developing nations allow foreign competitors to enter their 
telecom markets indiscriminately, they would only be assured that new 
entrants would endeavor to service wealthy individual and business 
consumers who could afford sophisticated telecom services (leaving 
the problem of universal service unresolved). Moreover, a greater 
percentage of the telecom infrastructure would be under the control 
of foreign operators (thereby endangering national security). 
90 See PETRAZZINI, supra note 18, at 16-18. 
9l See Kennard, supra note 16. While this basic idea has much intuitive merit as well as factual 
data to support it, one must not forget that the privatized monopoly system was the AT&T system 
before the 1984 consent decree. 
92 The United States has been implementing telecommunications reform on a fairly grand scale 
since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (see supra note 52, and accompanying text), while the 
European Union ("EU") had an internal deadline of Jan. I, 1998, for competition in all aspects 
of its telecom market. For an overview of liberalization in the EU, see Catherine Curran Butcher, 
Teiecommunicatiuns in the European Union, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 451 (1996). 
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B. Beyond the Mantras of Privatization and Liberalization: Telecom 
Law That Addresses Developing Countries 
19 
The ideal GIl would likely take the form of a mosaic composed of 
privatized firms competing in liberalized markets throughout the 
world. But the path to that ideal must take some other form if the GIl 
is to have nodes in the developing world. Telecom laws in the form of 
national policy and private contract may be used to address the con-
crete issues preventing telecom development. 
1. Universal Service 
The first concrete issue that telecom laws must address is the issue 
of universal service. Private firms invest in developing countries for the 
purpose of profit. For that reason, they are interested primarily in 
servicing richer urban areas populated by businesses and not poorer, 
rural areas. A conflict thus arises between one of the government's 
purposes of allowing the foreign investment (i.e., universal service) and 
the preferable business plan of the foreign firm. A compromise be-
tween the government and the foreign firm may be reached by utiliz-
ing the concept of universal access. 
Universal access is the notion that telecommunications equipment 
may be shared by several people so as to effect service for all. 93 A 
primitive example of this is a public telephone in a village.94 A sophis-
ticated example is a computer workstation in a village utilizing a cel-
lular modem to access the Internet via satellite technology.95 
The government of a developing country may use the notion of 
universal access to effect a quid pro quo with a foreign firm. The 
9~ See Wellenius, supra note 64, at 436-37. 
94 [d. at 436. 
95 Modern satellite technology presents an excellent opportunity to employ the concept of 
universal access. Companies such as Teledesic, Iridium and Globalstar are developing global 
satellite networks that will provide seamless telecom access throughout the world. Since every 
country retains sovereign rights to the radio spectrum within its own borders, the satellite firms 
must negotiate with the governments to secure wireless licenses. The target market for the satellite 
system is business users willing to pay a premium for seamless service (with early estimates of 
$3.00 per minute access charges). In the early years of operation, the satellite systems will likely 
possess much unused capacity until the customer base has an opportunity to develop. As one 
condition of granting a wireless license to these satellite firms, governments of developing nations 
could require the firms to offer free use of their systems to rural areas for education, emergencies, 
etc. For an overview of the licensing of these satellite systems, see Ted Stevens, Comment, 
Regulation and Licensing of Low-Earth-Orbit Satellites, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 401 (1994). 
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government may allow a foreign firm to enter a telecom market and 
service wealthier customers on the condition that the foreign firm 
spends certain monies (which may be a percentage of revenue or net 
income) on universal access programs. This is not a revolutionary 
concept: it is old-fashioned cross-subsidization. Some data suggest that 
universal access programs may be achieved at a cost of only 1 % of 
telecom revenues.96 The important point is that cross-subsidization 
need not be confined to a state-owned PTT system.97 In fact, cross-sub-
sidization may be employed in either a monopoly or a non-monopoly 
setting. While critics of a privatized monopoly have good reason to be 
concerned about potential abuse by the monopoly provider, a national 
policy of universal access embedded in a contract between government 
and a telecom corporation can and would alleviate such concerns. 
Moreover, in the absence of a multilateral treaty guaranteeing 
"equal" access to foreign firms, a government would have the flexibility 
to negotiate differing universal access concessions with different tele-
com providers. Under international trade law, demanding greater con-
cessions from one firm over another would be tantamount to violating 
most-favored-nation status if the firms were based in different coun-
tries. Conversely, under contract law, negotiating different terms with 
different companies may reflect only the varying attributes that differ-
ent firms bring to the table. Additionally, capitalist instincts do not 
abhor playing bidders against one another in order to secure a pre-
mium price.98 
2. National Security 
The issue of national security has two facets, one based on law 
enforcement and the other on economics. Concerns about law en-
forcement are handled best by the legal structure of regulation, while 
economic issues are addressed best by the legal structure of ownership. 
96 See Wellenius, supra note 64, at 436-37. Chile is experiencing success with a universal access 
program possessing an annual budget of $4 million in a country with a $500 million telecom 
industry. 
97 AT&T operated in a privately owned monopoly system using the principle of cross-subsidi-
zation. 
98 Indeed, as mentioned previously in section I(B), supra, telecom firms will undoubtedly 
buttress their own positions by engaging different governments in negotiations. 
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a. Law Enforcement 
When a government gives up ownership and control of its telecom 
system, it relinquishes, to a certain extent, the power to monitor its 
citizens. This fact may make the government of any developing (or 
developed) country somewhat nervous. While contemporary literature 
focuses almost exclusively on the ability of encrypted electronic com-
munication to hinder the efforts of law enforcement,99 governments 
have historically worried about giving foreign entities control over the 
telecom infrastructure and the information it provides. lOo The exist-
ence of a foreign operator places a cumbersome barrier between the 
government and the end-user that may inhibit the government's ability 
to monitor, or (even worse) expose the type and amount of monitoring 
by government to non-governmental third parties. 
The issue of law enforcement as a national security issue can be 
touchy, but it may be solved by the process of regulation. If a PIT 
system is to be fragmented, then an independent regulator must be 
created in order to manage competition among telecom firms and 
observe whether new firms honor their contractual agreements with 
the government. Within a particular contractual arrangement, a for-
eign firm may be required to use equipment to which law enforcement 
could gain access, or the firm may be required to release usage data 
revealing the type or number of connections that is predetermined to 
represent potential illegal activity. Of course, the foreign firm may balk 
at any requirement that forces it to breach consumer privacy. However, 
many of the most "liberal" societies, including the United States, grant 
law enforcement virtually unbridled access to telecom infrastructure. IOI 
99 See, e.g., Bernadette Barnard, Note, Leveraging Warldwide Encryption Standards via U.S. 
Expart Controls: The U.S. Government's Ability to "Safeguard" the Global Information Infrastructure, 
1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 429 (1997); Froomkin, supra note 77. 
looIn the United States, for example, section 31O(b) of the Communications Act of 1934,47 
U.S.C. §§ 151-163, places a prima facie foreign ownership restriction of 25% in a U.S. company 
possessing a radio license (i.e., a wireless provider). Furthermore, section 214 of the 1934 Act 
limits the ability of foreign telecom firms to provide wireline service in the U.S. 
The FCC has eased these restrictions recently for WTO countries in the wake of the Agreement 
on Basic Telecommunications. But the limitations on non-WTO members remains. For an over-
view of the restrictions on wireless providers, see Vincent M. Paladini, Fareign Ownership Restric-
tions Under Section 31O(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 19%,14 B.U. INT'L LJ. 341 (1996). 
Readers interested in an overview of the FCC's rationale relating to the easing of restrictions on 
WTO members should see FCC news release Commission Liberalizes Participation in the U.S. 
Telecommunications Market, (visited Mar. 15, 1999), <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/lnterna-
tionai/News_Releases/1997/nrin7042. html>. 
101 The history of wiretapping in the United States provides a fascinating legal story. The 
22 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXII, No. 1 
b. Economic Strength as a Measure of National Security 
More complicated than the issue of granting law enforcement access 
to telecom infrastructure is the problem of controlling the develop-
ment of the infrastructure itself. The prime motivation for developing 
nations accepting foreign investment is the improvement of their tele-
com system both for the good of the system and the good of other 
industries and activities that depend on telecommunications. It would 
therefore be unacceptable, for example, for a foreign firm (based on 
its consolidated balance sheet) to delay or refuse to improve the system 
at the expense of the developing nation. 
In an era when national strength is measured in dollars, not troops, 
many developing nations cannot afford a foreign telecom operator 
that places private profit above the nation's GDP. But no foreign firm 
will enter a new market if the government of the developing nation 
intends to dictate the firm's strategic direction. When the govern-
ment's concerns over development surpass those that can be appeased 
by universal access concessions (which, by their nature, are focused 
only on the telecom industry), the government may solve its problems 
by retaining majority or ultimate ownership of the system. 
A government may gain substantial investment funds and retain 
majority ownership of a corporatized PTT by issuing shares to the 
public through international stock exchanges. The Chinese govern-
ment followed such a path when it sold shares in China Telecom, which 
constitutionality of wiretapping is divided into an early and later stage marked by Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 u.s. 438 (1927) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), respectively. 
In Olmstead, law enforcement officials wiretapped a phone line without a warrant in order to 
gain evidence of crimes related to transactions in alcohol during Prohibition. 277 u.s. at 456-57. 
The plaintiff argued that the wiretap violated his Fourth (and Fifth) Amendment rights. See id. 
at 459. The majority, noting that no physical trespass by law enforcement occurred (since the 
phone line was "tapped" outside the boundary of the plaintiff's residence), concluded that no 
place was searched and nothing had been seized. See id. at 469. Hence, there was no violation of 
the Fourth Amendment (and subsequently, for reasons not relevant here, no violation of the Fifth 
Amendment). 
Justice Brandeis, in one of the most elegant and prophetic dissents in history, stated "Ways may 
some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, 
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate 
occurrences of the home. 'That places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer' 
was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these .... Can it be that the Constitution 
affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?" See id. at 514. 
The Katz court, forty years later, adopted Justice Brandeis' view and held that search warrants 
were necessary constitutionally to wiretap, thereby overruling Olmstead. Although a moral victory 
for privacy advocates, few would deny that approval of such warrants amounts currently to a 
"rubber stamp." 
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remains majority-owned by China's Ministry of Posts and Telecommu-
nications.102 The Chinese government raised $4 billion in the initial 
public offering held in October, 1997.103 
M.yority ownership, however, does not give a government the license 
to ignore the company's interest for the sake of the nation. Under 
well-settled principles of corporate law, most states recognize that ma-
jority shareholders of a corporation have certain fiduciary duties to 
minority shareholders. 1M Under U.S. law, a majority shareholder that 
acts in a manner that suggests self-dealing will have the burden of 
proving that minority shareholders have been treated fairly.105 Al-
though different nations' laws can, and undoubtedly will, vary to a 
certain extent with regard to a majority shareholder's fiduciary duty to 
minority shareholders, it is unsound to believe that merely retaining 
majority ownership in a corporatized PTT will grant a government full 
authority to ignore or minimize the profit-seeking motive of the cor-
poration, if for no other reason than the value of the minority shares 
would suffer from such an arrangement. 
A better option for the government wishing to maintain greater 
control over telecom development is a project financing arrangement 
whereby the government retains ultimate ownership over all, or part, 
of the telecom system.106 Project finance is a blanket term encompass-
ing a variety of different activities that possess the common feature of 
securing loans used for infrastructure development by the projected 
cash flow of the completed operation.107 In the context of telecommu-
nications, the foreign firm would borrow funds to be secured by the 
cash flow from the telecom project.1OS A foreign firm will be interested 
in a project finance arrangement if the anticipated cash flow of the 
102 Erik Guyot and Shanthi Kalathil, China Telecom &ises $4 BiUion in Share Offer, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 17, 1997, at A18. 
10! See id. 
104 See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 
717,720-22 (Del. 1971). 
I05Id. 
I06Project financing may involve different areas of telecom infrastructure (e.g., a central 
wireline system or peripheral wireless systems). A government that desires to control only part of 
the telecom infrastructure may elect to maintain ultimate control over the central wireline system 
while allowing private ownership of the wireless sector, or vice-versa. 
107 See Glen S. Gerstell & Lisa Boykin, Structuring a Telecommunicatiuns Dea~ 1014 PU/Corp 
27,27 (1997). 
lOS It is not unthinkable that the government itself would borrow the funds and exclude the 
foreign firm, but for the reasons set forth infra, there is little motivation to disregard the firm's 
management expertise when the government need not sacrifice ultimate ownership of the system. 
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operation will cover operating expenses, debt service, taxes, other 
miscellaneous expenses, and most importantly, an adequate return on 
investmen t.l09 
Project finance can allow for an attractive ownership situation when 
used in conjunction with a build-operate-transfer ("BOT") transac-
tion. l1O In a BOT transaction, a foreign firm will improve a telecom 
system, operate it during a co"ntractual period designed to allow the 
firm to realize an adequate profit, and then transfer ownership back 
to the government.111 As a private contract, the terms of a BOT trans-
action may vary depending on the needs of the parties. For example, 
a government interested primarily in achieving universal service may 
negotiate that cash flow exceeding a given rate of return will be used 
to fund universal access programs. On the other hand, a government 
wishing to regain ownership of the system as soon as possible may 
negotiate that excess cash flow will be kept by the foreign firm in 
exchange for an early transfer date. 
The BOT model is not without its drawbacks. Its closed-end nature 
may discourage participation by telecom firms that wish to expend 
their energy on projects that will last into perpetuity. Furthermore, 
there is no guarantee that a well-run private operation will continue 
its efficiency when transferred back to the government. However, for 
those developing nations that cannot-Qr more likely, will not-accept 
permanent foreign ownership of their telecom infrastructure, the BOT 
model presents an admirable compromise. 
c. Where Developing Countries Can Lead in Telecommunications Policy: 
"Structured Competition" 
The state of telecom infrastructure in developing countries is bleak 
and will continue to be bleak unless the governments of those coun-
tries manifest the courage to move forward, away from the PTT system. 
Fortunately, many developing nations are taking strong steps in the 
direction of reform. For example, there are currently more than 
109 See Gerstell & Boykin, sujrra note 107, at 27. As mentioned, supra, Part I(B), non-recourse 
financing would enhance the attractiveness of the deal. 
lIO See generaUy Sozzi, sujrra note 15, at 454-86. Another form of the build-ilperate-transfer 
transaction is the build-transfer-ilperate ("BTO") transaction, which is less attractive for telecom 
firms since their ability to run the firm according to their own discretion is inhibited by govern-
ment ownership. See id. 
III See id. at 455. 
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twenty-five nations in sub-Saharan Mrica that are m the process of 
restructuring their telecom industry.l12 
There is one area of telecom policy, however, where developing 
nations can move ahead of their developed counterparts and accom-
plish many of their goals in the process. This system may be termed 
"structured competition" because it forces private firms to compete, 
whether or not they want to, by fostering competition through the 
separation of facility development and servicing end users. 
The concept of structured competition is both retro and forward-
looking; it is part Glass-SteagalP13 and part Telecommunications Act of 
1996.114 Structured competition would prohibit the owners of wire line 
or wireless infrastructure from selling telecommunications service to 
end-users unless given approval by the national regulator. 
The concept of structured competition is likely to be attacked for a 
variety of reasons by different critics. Economists may attack structured 
competition on the same grounds that they attack Glass-Steagall-that 
artificial separation by the government creates inefficient and illegiti-
mate management by a government regulator. Consumers may attack 
structured competition on the grounds that it will increase prices by 
creating two corporate mouths to feed when one would suffice. Tele-
com firms may attack structured competition on the grounds that it 
would hinder competition by disallowing the synergistic merger of 
companies that controlled different pieces of the telecom pie. 
All of these arguments against structured competition are viable 
until one considers a few key facts. First, in 1999, three years after the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 was passed in the United States, there 
is virtually no competition for local residential phone service in the 
United States, with the Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs") 
maintaining de facto monopoly status.l15 Second, the RBOCs have sys-
tematically blocked attempts by long-distance companies to "resell" 
their network capacity because it is more profitable for the RBOCs to 
keep their customers than resell capacity to other service providers. ll6 
112 Wellenius, supra note 64, at 434. 
IUClass-Steagall is The Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1998), and was the Act that 
separated commercial from investment banking. 
114 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered 
sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
115 See infra notes 116 and 117 and accompanying text. 
116 See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 1998 WI.. 102481 
(8th Cir.) (1998). The RBOCs are arguing that it is unlawful for the FCC to dictate the rates at 
which other service providers may "interconnect" to their infrastructure. While the particular 
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Third, consumers of telecom service have little incentive to change 
providers in the absence of markedly superior service or markedly 
lower prices by the new market entrant (which, ipso jacto, places the 
new entrant in the bad position of having to build a superior system 
at the same price as an incumbent, having to build a comparable 
system at a lower price than the incumbent, or having to spend large 
amounts on a marketing blitz in order to convince consumers that a 
comparable system is, in fact, superior). The reason why "mere" com-
petition will not work well in the telecom industry is that incumbent 
monopoly providers begin with huge advantages over new market 
entrants in terms of brand identification, customer information and, 
most importantly, subscriber base.ll7 
Structured competition may be used by developing nations to help 
solve several of their problems. First, the separation of the industry 
into network owners and resellers will diffuse private ownership so as 
to prevent anyone foreign firm from dominating the telecom industry, 
creating more competition and leaving the government with more 
control over any particular market participant. Second, network own-
ers will have an incentive to contract with as many resellers as possible 
since unused capacity is not offset by savings gained from keeping 
competitors out of the market.us Third, the government may increase 
universal access by allowing network owners to service poorer areas 
directly at low fees, when feasible, or through some form of cross-sub-
sidization from profits gained by the network-owning wholesalers or 
reseUers. And of course, the government may suspend structured com-
petition and allow "full" competition when either its nascent telecom 
industry will not support several market participants, or competition 
has evolved to the point where artificial divisions are no longer neces-
sary.ll9 
legal issue is undecided, it is undisputed that the price that the FCC has determined to be fair 
is less than what the RBOCs earn servicing the end users. See also A.T. & T. Corp. v. Iowa Uti!. 
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999). 
Il7This reality has led U.S. long-distance firms to petition the FCC to consider requiring the 
RBOCs to divest their infrastructure and compete on the same playing field as the new entrants 
in local service. For an overview of the issue, see Elizabeth Douglass, Push fur Sell-off of Bells' 
Netwurk operations Gains, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 12, 1998, at E5. 
lIB This proposition presumes that the network owner is competing itself and has no capability 
to keep its wholesale rates artificially high. 
119 Many observers have concluded that Glass-Steagall, while once necessary and beneficial, is 
now antiquated in light of (seemingly) thriving competition in the financial services industry. 
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CONCLUSION 
The telecom industry in most developing nations is in a sorry state. 
The history of state-owned PTT monopolies has produced inefficient 
telecom systems that are unable to meet the needs of 20th century 
society, let alone the needs of an information-driven 21st century 
society. While multilateral and commercial lending will continue to 
contribute to the development oftelecom infrastructure, the dominant 
form of investment in telecom systems in developing nations will come 
from private telecom firms investing and participating directly. 
The governments of developing countries have the difficult job of 
balancing foreign firms' need for profits with telecom development 
that will benefit the whole of their societies. These governments must 
create an environment that will allow private investors to achieve ade-
quate financial returns while securing universal telecom access for all 
of their citizens and limiting the negative effects of privatized telecom 
systems, which include potential reductions in national security both 
in terms of law enforcement and overall economic strength. 
Multilateral effort, in the form of the GATS Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications, does not present an answer to the problems of 
developing nations because its conception of privatization and liberali-
zation was formed from perceptions of developed countries' markets 
which cannot be simply transplanted to the emerging markets of the 
Third World. However, telecommunications laws that combine eco-
nomic realities with national policies promoting universal access, eco-
nomic growth and structured competition can be used to create con-
tracts between the public and private sectors that will serve developing 
nations well. 
